Japon

Competitiveness of the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese Automobile Industries

Shioji, Hiromi (2012).  Competitiveness of the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese Automobile Industries. Gerpisa colloquium. The automobile industry has been developing remarkably in the East Asian countries—Japan, Korea, and China—in recent years. In terms of domestic production, China produced 18.3 million vehicles in 2010, more than any other country in the world. Japan is the second largest, at 9.6 million. Korea ranks fifth, at 4.3 million. Out of the top five automobile industries, three are in East Asia. In 2001, Japan held the second place, and Korea the fifth; China was in the seventh place. This momentum will not stagnate; production in China will increase to around 25 million by the middle of the 2010s, and is likely to exceed the output of other countries. This paper aims to analyse the international competitiveness of the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese automobile industries. Analysing in detail the production, sales, and import/export statistics published by each country’s Automobile Manufacturer Association, we clarify the competitiveness of each country and the differences among them. There are many existing research studies on the competitiveness of the East Asian automobile industries.3 These studies analysed many aspects of automobile makers, such as their development, production, distribution, finance, supply chains, organizational capability, industrial policies of government, and historical process. There is, however, little research about how the international competitiveness of a country’s automobile industry as a whole can be examined quantitatively. Most existing research only introduces production and export numbers as numerical indices of international competitiveness; these numbers are based only on ‘Producer Country Base’ (later described). This paper analyses the total international competitiveness of the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese automobile industries.

Renault-Nissan et GM-PSA : similitudes et différences

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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa et conseiller scientifique de la Chaire de Management des Réseaux du Groupe Essca.

Même si ceci ne manquera pas de susciter quelqu’énervement chez PSA, les lumières qui nous ont été fournies cette semaine sur la forme que va prendre "l’alliance stratégique mondiale" GM-PSA font d’abord penser – comme Florence Lagarde l’a souligné déjà la semaine dernière - à Renault-Nissan. Le fait que les deux piliers de la coopération mise en avant soient le partage des plateformes d’un côté et la création d’une structure commune d’achat de l’autre, que la gouvernance de l’Alliance soit assurée par un "steering committee" composé de 4 top managers des deux entreprises, que l’identité des marques soit préservée et gérée hors de l’Alliance tout comme les outils industriels qui continueront d’être dédiés sont autant d’éléments qui rendent comparables les deux manières de procéder.

Cette démarche intermédiaire entre la fusion et la coopération ponctuelle s’explique dans les deux cas par la nécessité politique de respecter l’identité et la "nationalité" des parties d’une part et par la prudence stratégique et organisationnelle que les entreprises ont tiré de leurs expériences passées et de celles qu’ils ont vu d’autres faire d’autre part. read more

Transplant Automotive Clusters and the Country of Origin in the Southern States of the United States

Luethge, Denise J., Michael McDermott, & Philippe Byosiere (2012).  Transplant Automotive Clusters and the Country of Origin in the Southern States of the United States. Gerpisa colloquium. This paper will examine the strategic role of each transplant in the parent company’s global strategy, investigate signs of subsidiary entrepreneurship, and examine technology flows between each transplant in the south and the Multinational Corporation as a whole, as well as determine the extent to which theses transplants in the south are creating “centers of excellence” within the MNC, and embedded clusters within the region that is so important for locational enduring competitive advantage.

Crisis without end or crisis as a chance.

Bungsche, Holger (2012).  Crisis without end or crisis as a chance.. Gerpisa colloquium. Holger Bungsche Professor at the School for International Studies Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya Japan Preliminary title of the paper: Crises without End – Crisis as a Chance Japan’s Automobile Industry and Automobile Market after the Financial, the 3/11 Tsunami and the Thailand Flood Crises Outline of the paper: Since 2008 Japan’s automobile industry is continuously confronted with crises. After the financial crisis of 2008/09, which in fact was a huge sales crisis hitting especially car exports from Japan and local production in Japan’s second home market the USA, the industry had to deal with the effects of the Tsunami disaster in March 2011. On the one hand, supply chains that proved to be very vulnerable to natural disasters had to be reorganized, and on the other hand factories throughout Japan had to rearrange production schedules in order to evade electricity shortages. Finally, the flood disaster in Thailand, which especially affected the supply chain of foreign production sites of Japanese manufacturers also showed shortcomings of the internationalization strategies of Japanese companies, especially Toyota and Honda. In addition to that, Japanese car producers have to deal with an adverse exchange rate of the Yen that appreciating for instance by about 60% against the Euro since 2009. Against the above outlined background, my paper will concentrate on two issues. The first issue is the impact the crises have or had on the Japanese domestic car market. In this part my paper will discuss the ongoing changes in the Japanese car market as well as the increasing political pressure to boost ecological friendly cars. Although fundamental reforms of the car and gasoline taxation system, which should have been implemented in April 2012, could not yet be achieved, the tax exemption regulations and incentive schemes for purchasing low emission and energy efficient cars, which was initially planed to expire in March 2012, will very likely be extended for another 3 years, applying much stricter efficiency standards then in the initial stage. The second issue will concern the reactions of the car manufacturers towards the crises, particular with respect to reorganizing the supply chains after the earthquake and tsunami in North-Eastern Japan as well as after the flood in Thailand. This part of the paper will also ask whether there are efforts to decentralize or relocate production as well as whether there are intensified attempts made to increase production efficiency further in order to save energy, which could also be seen as a step towards sustainable development in manufacturing. Extending the scope of my presentation beyond the developments in the Japanese car market after the financial crisis, which was the central aspect of my presentation last year, this year’s paper intents to shed light on the organizational challenges and changes that are resulting from the various crises. Relevance and Links to the GERPISA Program and the 2012 Conference: The paper has relevance to the overall theme of the GERPISA conference ‘Structuring new Automotive Industries, Structuring old Automotive Industries, and the New Global Geopolitics of the Automotive Sector. It especially relates to the themes (6) Restructuring processes affecting the European, American and Japanese automotive industries, but also partially to theme (1) New kinds of mobility, new markets, new public policies as well as theme (4) Manufacturer trajectories and strategies

Toyota’s new strategy in Eastern Japan

Orihashi, Shinya (2012).  Toyota’s new strategy in Eastern Japan. Gerpisa colloquium. At the end of last year, Toyota announced to integrate its three manufacturing subsidiaries in eastern Japan area into one subsidiary, Toyota Motor East Japan. The three manufacturing subsidiaries are Central Motor Co., Ltd., Kanto Auto Works, Ltd. and Toyota Motor Tohoku Corporation. Most of their operation is located in Northeastern Japan area (Tohoku region, including six prefectures: Aomori, Akita, Iwate, Yamagata, Miyagi and Fukushima). Central Motor Co., Ltd. relocated its assembly plant from Tokyo urban area to Tohoku region in early 2011, just before the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11th, 2011. As a resident researcher of Tohoku region, I would like to examine about merits and demerits of this strategic move for Toyota as well as regional economy of Tohoku region. Then, I will discuss about supply chain disruption caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Du modèle japonais il y a vingt ans au modèle allemand aujourd’hui : qu’y a-t-il derrière ces mythes ?

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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Le Gerpisa accueillait vendredi dans le cadre de ses journées mensuelles de travail (voir http://gerpisa.org/node/1538) Tommaso Pardi, sociologue et directeur adjoint du Gerpisa qui a, fin novembre, soutenu sa thèse portant sur les implantations japonaises en Europe et les difficultés qu’elles ont rencontrées. Intitulée "La révolution qui n'a pas eu lieu: les constructeurs japonais en Europe (1970-2010)", cette thèse importante propose, entre autres apports majeurs, une "histoire du lean" comme idéologie managériale qui s’impose dans les années 90 et reste depuis au cœur des discours mobilisateurs par lesquels passe la quête de l’amélioration des performances. C’est sur cette question spécifique qu’est intervenu T. Pardi ce vendredi en s’arrêtant longuement sur la genèse et l’accueil de l’ouvrage fondateur de nos collègues américains Womack, Jones et Roos qui publièrent en 1990 "The Machine that Changed the World" qui, avec le soutien de Raymond H. Lévy, alors patron de Renault qui le préfaça, fût traduit en France dès 1992 sous le titre "Le système qui va changer le monde". read more

Les réalités contrastées de la coopération interentreprises : une comparaison France-Japon

Heim, Stéphane (2011).  Les réalités contrastées de la coopération interentreprises : une comparaison France-Japon. Journées du Gerpisa. Présentation Le contexte : le modèle de production japonais, où en sommes-nous ? Brève présentation de l’enquête La coordination des ensembles sociotechniques La construction des marchés d’organisations Quelques conclusions

Les tensions entre Suzuki et Volkswagen : une ombre au tableau de la réussite impériale

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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Weekly column by Bernard Jullien director of Gerpisa.

Passé un peu inaperçu dans l’actualité automobile de l’été, l’épisode très conflictuel de la vie de la jeune alliance Suzuki-VW était au centre des commentaires au Japon en juillet. Il a continué d’être assez largement scruté en août.

Rappelons que VW et Suzuki s’étaient rapprochés fin 2009. On avait alors vu VW prendre 19,9 % du capital de Suzuki pour 1,7 milliard d’euros. En retour, Suzuki devait à son tour rentrer au capital du groupe de Wolfsburg. Etant données les complémentarités technologiques et géographiques entre les deux entreprises, les analystes n’avaient guère eu de mal à trouver les arguments justifiant l’opération. Ils avaient toutefois eu tendance à regarder très volontiers le dossier à partir des intérêts de Volkswagen et à faire comme si il s’agissait là d’une flèche supplémentaire – indienne - ajoutée dans le carquois, déjà convaincant, des équipes de Piech. read more

Nissan: Sustaining Revival

Stevens, Merieke, & Takahiro Fujimoto (2011).  Nissan: Sustaining Revival. Gerpisa colloquium. In this presentation we will cover the period of 2008-2011 at Nissan. The three main topics we discuss are the focus on electric vehicles Nissan has taken, the importance of the Chinese market, and the alliance with Renault. Nissan has heavily bet on electric vehicles (EVs) as its answer to the increasing demand for more environmentally friendly automobiles. In our chapter we question the likelihood of the widespread diffusion of EVs in the near future, mainly for cost reasons. We look into niche applications of EVs, which we expect to be more likely in the European market rather than the Japanese or United States markets. China is the largest single market for Nissan, representing nearly a quarter of its total global sales. Nissan markets its vehicles to rising middle classes such as China’s as “an important symbol of freedom, status and personal achievement.” We investigate Nissan’s success in this regard, and discuss future developments that are important for Nissan’s strategy in this respect. The Alliance between Renault and Nissan has continually be hauled as one of the exceptional successes of this scale. Renault and Nissan proved that cross cultural alliances can work. We identify several key aspects of this success. The main point we raise in this respect is that Renault and Nissan did not chase scale, but sought complementarities in markets, capabilities and product architectures.

Alternative powertrain strategies and fleet turnover in the 21st century

Belzowski, Bruce, & Walter McManus (2011).  Alternative powertrain strategies and fleet turnover in the 21st century. Gerpisa colloquium. The changes taking place in the global automotive industry related to alternative powertrains and fuels are affecting each country or region differently. Each country or region has its own policies in place to monitor and manage vehicle fuel consumption and emissions. Countries or regions also have different numbers of new vehicles sold annually and the total numbers of vehicles in their fleets. This analysis looks at the current and future direction of alternative powertrains/fuels across four developed economies (United States, Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea) and four developing economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in order to measure the impact of increasing the number of alternative powertrains/fuels in their fleets. In particular, the analysis looks at how much of each country’s fleet will turn over to vehicles based only on alternative powertrains/fuels by 2050 by introducing three different alternative powertrain/fuel models (less aggressive, moderately aggressive, and very aggressive). A less aggressive approach will yield fleet turnover rates of 60 percent or more for most countries, a moderately aggressive approach will yield fleet turnover rates of over 80 percent for most countries, and a very aggressive approach will yield fleet turnover rates of nearly 90 percent or more for most countries.

De la nouvelle géographie de la production au nouveau paysage géostratégique dans l’automobile mondiale

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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

La parution des chiffres de l’Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA) sur la production 2010 dans le monde a été relativement peu commentée. Elle fait pourtant apparaître de manière criante le caractère irréversible de l’irruption d’un nouvel ordre automobile mondial. En effet, outre le fait que la Chine assure désormais presque un quart de la production (18,2 millions des 77,6 millions de VP et de VUL fabriqués dans le monde), l’importance prise par les nouveaux pays de l’automobile durant la crise ressort avec éclat. Si l’on compare ainsi 2010 à 2007 où la production mondiale avait été de 73,3 millions, il ressort que les seuls BRIC représentaient en 2007 moins de 16 millions de véhicules produits (21,4% de la production mondiale) alors qu’en 2010 ils en auront assemblés 27 millions (c’est à dire 34,6%). De même, dans la hiérarchie mondiale des pays constructeurs, la France était encore au 6ème rang en 2007. En ayant vu sa production passer de 3 à 2,2 millions alors que la production croissait rapidement ailleurs, Brésil, Inde, Mexique et Espagne sont désormais devant elle et la France pointe au 10ème rang. Au sein de l’Europe, le redéploiement des productions est également très frappant puisque, avec une production de 857 000 véhicules, l’Italie est par exemple devenue un producteur de moindre importance que la République Tchèque ou la Pologne. read more

Fukushima et la légitimité du Véhicule Electrique

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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Contestée depuis longtemps par les écologistes, la solution que représente le VE aux yeux de ses promoteurs l’est aussi par les tenants du rêve automobile et de la liberté que la voiture confère à son propriétaire d’aller vite et loin en bénéficiant de tous les gadgets et de tout le confort auquel son statut et ses revenus lui donnent droit. La catastrophe japonaise conduit ainsi à la formation d’une coalition assez hétéroclite, mariage d’une carpe écologiste radicale et d’un lapin autophile et conservateur. Vous trouverez ainsi une mise à mort rhétorique du VE sous la plume de Marcel Robert sur le site très violemment "anti-bagnole" Carfree.free.fr et une charge du même tonneau sous celle de Jean-Michel Cravy sur son blog on ne peut plus autophile autopanorama.over-blog.com. Dans un style beaucoup plus soft, A.-G. Verdevoye dans La Tribune, N. Bourassi sur EasyBourse.com ou B. read more

External product variety in the automotive industry: An empirical analysis of German and Japanese OEM operations

Staeblein, Thomas, Katsuki Aoki, & Takahiro Tomino (2011).  External product variety in the automotive industry: An empirical analysis of German and Japanese OEM operations. Gerpisa colloquium.

Today, consumers’ needs and wants are rapidly changing. In the automotive industry, increasing product variety has been reported resulting from such factors as changes in energy prices, and regional differences in safety and environmental regulations, in addition to the growing sophistication of consumers. For example, consumers in several countries expect to configure their own individual vehicles. The range of customization to meet such consumer requests, however, is greatly different. Some OEMs rely on providing only a low level of external variety, while others offer variety to an extent that the number of theoretical variants is higher than the number of actual sold units. Furthermore, the approach to response to customer orders from the point of sale to the delivery (i.e. the order fulfilment process) differs as well. Recent empirical research into product variety in the automotive industry has been mainly limited to OEMs from one region only. In this paper we present a comparison between German and Japanese cases. Our aim is to evaluate the consequences of different variety strategies.

Numerous aspects linked to product variety have been discussed by an interdisciplinary body of literature. The discussion in operations was driven by the results of MIT’s first International Automobile Assembly Plant Study conducted 1985-90 and extended by the debate on mass customization; through which product variety can be delivered to end customers at lower costs. In practice, for the past fifteen years, almost all OEMs have achieved operational excellence by the adaption of Japanese-based lean production principles. Competition, however, takes place in multiple dimensions simultaneously: firms need to develop appealing products, build attractive brands, and excel in operations. Thus, a central theme remains the decision on the ‘optimum’ or ‘appropriate’ level of variety: on the one hand, offering variety can provide differentiation in the marketplace, increasing revenues; on the other hand, it increases cost and lowers productivity.

The comparison of decisions by German and Japanese automotive OEMs shows differences concerning the level of external variety. We focus our analysis on customization based on so called ‘options’. Options are widely used in the automotive industry to provide product variety; e.g. customization of certain car models in terms of sun roof, air conditioning, four-wheel drive or navigation system. We study two levels of product variety by options: (1) customization that influences the manufacturing process by adding options that are integral to the product structure; and (2) customization that is added by options within the distribution system and that is independent of other elements of the product structure. An important indicator at the first level is the option content and variability that is being installed at the factory. Although this indicator is only a proxy for the complexity in the manufacturing process, it clearly shows differences within the variety being provided by a factory. Delaying the product differentiation (also called postponement or late-configuration) is common way to add customization at a later stage of the order fulfilment process. At the second level certain product and process design approaches such as standardization and modular product structure are typically necessary.

In our cross-case comparison, first, we collected data on product varieties, production and sales volumes, and factory conditions from five German and five Japanese major OEMs in order to understand the general differences. Then, we collected more detailed data on order fulfilment processes and mass customization techniques from each one German and Japanese case. As part of our data collection, we have conducted more than 30 interviews at these OEMs from 2008-10. The interviews are conducted not only in the manufacturing departments, but also in further relevant organizational units, such as sales, marketing, and planning. Our analysis has been extended by factory observation of five factories over the same time-horizon.

The main focus is the link of order-fulfilment inside the factory. We investigate the implication of product variety by options; compare the assembly line set-up, and the complexity in manufacturing. How both OEMs apply mass customization strategies to mitigate negative effects of product variety is further studied. Particularly, the analysis of distribution-based mass customization techniques, namely postponement/late-configuration and option bundling is an additional focus.

The findings show a great difference in the extent of external variety between German and Japanese OEMs. Regarding the two OEMs in our study, we find that in Japan several different car models are assembled on one line. For each model only a low variety based on the option content is added. Very similar tasks for the assembly worker are being performed even for different models based on a standardised production system. In Germany, fewer models are assembled on a certain line, but the models have a greater variety by the number of factory installed options and their variability. Similar tasks for the assembly worker are given by the limitation on a fewer model-mix per assembly line. In Germany, the average number of factory installed options is six times higher. The use of distribution-based mass customization techniques is in greater use in Japan, as customization is also done in the distribution-system by dealers using postponement/late-configuration. Such techniques tend to be in use only for accessories in Germany. Further mass customization is done in Japan by a greater extent of option bundling, while the German OEM offers single options and also their combination in bundles.

In conclusion, our study provides empirical evidence on the extent of external variety in Japan and Germany, which order fulfillment processes are currently in use, and how two companies from Japan and Germany apply mass customization techniques to reduce negative impacts of variety in the factory.

Bernard Jullien et Tommaso Pardi interviennent à France Culture

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Date: 
11/10/2010
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"L’industrie automobile"

Travailler chez Toyota : de l’emploi à vie à la course à la survie

Pardi, Tommaso (2009).  Travailler chez Toyota : de l’emploi à vie à la course à la survie. La Revue de l'IRES. 3(62), 39-70.

Nous chercherons tout d’abord à analyser comment le système de relations salariales propre à la lean production s’est structuré et généralisé au Japon. Cela nous permettra de comprendre pourquoi la direction de Toyota a longtemps hésité avant d’établir des sites de production aux Etats-Unis et en Europe. Le constructeur japonais craignait en effet de ne pas pouvoir y reproduire son système de gestion de l’emploi ni son organisation du travail, ces éléments étant tous deux indispensables à la mise en œuvre de son système de production (Lung, Bélis-Bergouignan, 1994). Nous verrons par ailleurs que la gestion des ressources humaines réussit à se plier aux exigences du fl ux tendu de la production grâce à la mise en concurrence de sa main-d’œuvre jeune et la mise à l’écart de sa main-d’œuvre âgée, malade ou moins performante. Cela nous permettra de montrer à quel point l’emploi à vie et le salaire à l’ancienneté, systématiquement associés à ce système de gestion des ressources humaines, ne concernent en fait qu’une minorité de salariés, la majorité étant contrainte d’accepter des emplois beaucoup moins bien payés chez des sous-traitants de troisième et de quatrième rangs. Nous verrons en outre que l’organisation du travail s’appuie, elle aussi, sur une mise en concurrence continuelle des salariés afi n d’obtenir leur forte participation à la réduction des coûts, ce qui, en retour, alimente le processus
de sélection de la main-d’œuvre. L’analyse développée ici accordera une attention particulière aux conditions institutionnelles et économiques qui ont permis à ce système de relations salariales d’être socialement et industriellement viable au Japon, en soulignant trois phénomènes majeurs : le syndicalisme d’entreprise, l’organisation en keiretsu de la sous-traitance et une croissance régulière et soutenue de la production.
Après avoir analysé le SPT au Japon, nous nous intéresserons au cas de la fi liale Toyota en France. Nous montrerons que les nombreux problèmes rencontrés par le management et les syndicats de TMMF résultent directement des diffi cultés liées à la mise en cohérence du système de relations salariales propre à Toyota dans le contexte français. Par extension, il devient légitime de se demander s’il est vraiment opportun sur le plan politique d’imposer en France un tel système d’organisation du travail et de gestion de la main-d’œuvre, en tant que norme appliquée à toute la production
industrielle.

Ambitious Plans and Hard Realities: the Chinese Automobile Supply Parts Industry in a Challenging Competitive Environment

Bungsche, Holger (2010).  Ambitious Plans and Hard Realities: the Chinese Automobile Supply Parts Industry in a Challenging Competitive Environment. The Prospects and Limits to the Development of the Automotive Periphery. 42, 55-70.

The focus will be mainly on two aspects: The first aspect is the quickly proceeding integration of China in the automotive value chains in East and South-East Asia and the dynamic relationship between established and emerging markets in this region resulting from it. In this respect, the Japanese supply parts industry and the evolving Japanese- Chinese relationships in the production of supply parts will be of especial interest.
 
The second aspect the paper wishes to discuss, concerns the competitiveness of the Chinese supply parts manufacturers and the growing difficulties China is facing in establishing a strong national supply parts industry. In this respect, the structure of the Chinese supply parts industry, the problems of restructuring and concentrating the industry as well as the shortcomings of the development policy in the past will be addressed.

The paper will be divided into three parts. The first part will briefly give an overview over the size and structure of the Chinese supply parts industry as well as the development of the Chinese market for auto parts in recent years. In the second part we will discuss the topic of China as a production location for supply parts for the world car industry.
The third and largest part will then address the development of the Chinese national supply parts manufacturers and the question whether they are to become powerful competitors on a global level in the near future. Especially in this second and third part, in addition to the Chinese materials many data with respect to Japanese supply parts manufacturers in China will presented in order to illustrate both, the deep integration of China in the value chains in Asia on the one hand, and the
difficulties Chinese companies are facing to upgrade their position in these production networks. The paper will end with a critical assessment of the current situation and a short outlook on the future tasks and prospects of the Chinese auto supply part industry.

 

The Prospects and Limits to the Development of the Automotive Periphery

Domanski, Boleslaw (2010).  The Prospects and Limits to the Development of the Automotive Periphery. (Domanski B., Ed.).Actes du Gerpisa. 42,

The papers published in this issue of Actes du GERPISA focus on the evolution of the automotive industry in the peripheral countries and their changing role in the international division of labour in the automotive industry. The first aim is to achieve a better understanding of factors and mechanisms that spur and/or hinder industrial upgrading in less developed countries as defined according to Gereffi (2005) as a ‘move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global production networks’. This is related to the issue of the long-term prospects of the peripheral countries, i.e. the debate as to what extent their position can be sustained in the long run and how far the observed processes of functional upgrading in the international value chain can continue. These problems have gained special importance in the situation of the current crisis. One of the conclusions drawn by Humphrey, Lecler and Salerno (2000) was that a scenario of regional segmentation of the global vehicle industry was more likely than global homogeneity.
The trend towards regionalism has been supported by Freyssenet, Shimizu and Volpato (2003) and Carrillo, Lung and Van Tulder (2004). The papers in this issue discuss the development trajectories of countries that represent three different types of automotive periphery (see Humphrey, Lecler, Salerno, 2000): Mexico as an example of the Integrated Peripheral Market strongly integrated into the North American Free Trade Area (Sturgeon, Gereffi, Rogers, and Stark-Fernandez, this issue; Contreras, Carrillo, and Estrada, this issue), Mercosur as the case of the Emerging Regional Market not integrated into the Triad (Lung, this issue), and China as the best example of the Protected Autonomous Market and now the second largest automobile market behind the United States (Bungsche, this issue).

"Rappels de voiture: une plaie moderne"

Date: 
30/03/2010
Emission / Séminaire / Colloque: 
ABE - télé suisse
ernard Jullien participe à une émission spéciale du magazine télé ABE (Suisse) sur les rappels automobiles. Au sommaire: analyse du cas Toyota (avec visite à Toyota City), l'épidémie actuelle de rappels qui touchent toutes les marques, rôle des sous-traitants, un passage chez PSA Sochaux pour traiter la question des plateformes, puis chez l'équipementier allemand ZFS, et pour finir la qualité de la marque DACIA... http://www.tsr.ch/emissions/abe/1756005-rappel-de-voitures-une-epidemie-...

On the Way to a Low-carbon Society? Japan’s Tax Reforms and Incentive Scheme for Fostering Ecological Friendly Cars and Their Market Effects

Bungsche, Holger (2010).  On the Way to a Low-carbon Society? Japan’s Tax Reforms and Incentive Scheme for Fostering Ecological Friendly Cars and Their Market Effects. Gerpisa colloquium.

 The economic crisis that started with the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in August 2008 impressively proved that the world car industry and the automobile markets are moving into two different directions.

While in the established and mature automobile markets of the triad of North America, Europe and Japan sales of cars literally collapsed and slumped to a level of the 1970s, the developing markets, first and foremost of China, India and also Brazil were, if at all, only temporarily affected by the crisis and continued or even accelerated to grow. For example in China a simple reduction of the purchasing tax on cars with less than 1.6 liters engine displacement by 50% together with an incentive program intended to stimulate demand for cars in rural areas not only helped overcoming a slight decrease of car sales at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, but spurred domestic production to an extent that China in 2009 became the largest car producing country in the world with over 12 million manufactured vehicles.
With respect to the world automobile markets, it is therefore undoubtedly appropriate to say that ‘balance of power’ is shifting away from the triad markets towards these new developing markets. As a matter of fact, without the strong growth in theses developing countries the situation for many established car producers in the USA, Japan and to some lesser extent also Europe would have been much, much worse than it had been anyway.
With regard to Japan and the Japanese auto manufacturers, it is certainly not exaggerated to state that the Japanese car industry has been the second major loser of the crisis only next to the American industry.

The paper wishes, first, to analyze the influence of the financial and economic crisis on the Japanese automobile industry. Secondly, it intends to investigate the political reactions with respect to their intended ecological effects and their impact on the Japanese manufacturers as well as the import market. In its first part, the paper will first briefly discuss the specific differences of the current financial crisis in comparison with the crisis after the burst of the bubble economy in the 1990s. In a second part then, the impact of the financial crisis on the Japanese automobile market, industry and the manufacturers will be explained in more detail, before we will turn our attention in the last part to the government incentive programs and their effects on the car market. A short conclusion will finally summarize the main points again and add some thoughts with regard to the underlying question of the paper, whether Japan is really moving towards a low-carbon society in the automobile sector.

Putting Toyota in perspective : the causes, the consequences and the meaning of the present crisis

Pardi, Tommaso (2010).  Putting Toyota in perspective : the causes, the consequences and the meaning of the present crisis. Gerpisa colloquium.
The aim of this paper will be to put into perspective the present crisis of Toyota, taking into account both the evolution of its productive model and its historical trajectory.
 
First, it will important to identify the nature and the scope of the present crisis. It is indeed possible to talk about multiple crises – profitability crisis, quality crisis, management crisis, brand image crisis... What are therefore the actual elements that in each of these domains justify or not the use of the term "crisis" ? More precisely, is Toyota confronted with a temporary or with a structural crisis ?
 
Second, we will try to make some hypotheses concerning the causes of these crises. It is clear in fact that these crises are the result of a complex chain of factors, but it is too early to be able to identify them. Nevertheless, on the basis of the past trajectory of Toyota, and with the knowledge of how its productive model functions, it is possible to advance some hypotheses. Notably, by stressing the hidden fragility of the Toyota Production System, and the constraints that the fast paced internationalization of the company in these last ten years have placed on its viability conditions.
 
Third, we will identify which are at present the consequences of these crises, and also what they might be in the near and more distant future. Again, the understanding of the fragility of TPS leads us to believe that the crisis that Toyota is undergoing today will be deeper and longer than it is generally expected, and we will provide some explanations and evidences on why we do believe so.
 
Finally, we will discuss the meaning of this crisis, not only for Toyota, but for the whole sector as well. Since the late 1980s the TPS has been indeed the template that the sector has used to transform itself in a more efficient and flexible system of production. The results are by all standards very poor as the present structural crisis of the sector emphasis only too well. Now, even some advocates of Lean Production were stressing already in the middle of the 1990s most of its limits. The Gerpisa works have gone further in deconstructing this managerial panacea. Yet, the success of Toyota in the late 1990s and 2000s after a more difficult period in the early 1990s, had restored the general faith in Lean Production. Hopefully, this faith will be shattered by the present crisis, and the search for new ways of generating value in the sector will finally begin.

 

Suppression, Absorption, or Cooperation? European Works Councils and HR-Strategies in Japanese Car Manufacturers - The Case of Toyota and Honda

Hauser-Ditz, Axel, & Markus Hertwig (2010).  Suppression, Absorption, or Cooperation? European Works Councils and HR-Strategies in Japanese Car Manufacturers - The Case of Toyota and Honda. Gerpisa colloquium.

  • Leading role of ‘Japanese Production Systems’: Human relations models
  • Tranfering the elements of ‘Japanese Production Systems’ to other countries: problems of implementation / transposition
  • -Especially: How to deal with external/independent interest representation through trade unions which is typical for Europe and US-american industrial relations?
  • While Japanese companies typically try to cooperatively integrate employees, avoiding conflict and denying the existence of (at least sometimes) contradictory interests of employees and company.

Q1: Which HR-strategies do Japanese companies chose in order to legitimize and conform to the requirements of the EWC directive, on the one hand, and to keep up the principles of their cooperative and harmonized labour relations model, on the other?

Mitsubishi Motor Corporation: Leaving its deep crisis for an electric future?

Orihashi, Shinya, Daniel Arturo Heller, & Hidetada Higashi (2010).  Mitsubishi Motor Corporation: Leaving its deep crisis for an electric future?. Gerpisa colloquium.

Mitsubishi Motor Corporation: Leaving its deep crisis for an electric future?
 
Shinya ORIHASHI
 Associate Professor of Economics, Tohoku Gakuin University
Specially appointed researcher, MMRC, the University of Tokyo
 
Daniel Arturo HELLER
Associate Professor of Business Administration, Yokohama National University
 
Hidetada HIGASHI
Assistant Professor of Business, Yamanashi Gakuin University
 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC)’s predecessor was the motor vehicle division of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI), the beginnings of which can be dated back to the 1910s. So, MMC can be considered one of the oldest automobile manufacturers in Japan. In 1970, the motor vehicle division spun off from MHI and MMC was officially established. At the same time, MHI signed a joint venture agreement and received 15% equity participation from Chrysler Corporation, which lasted until 1985.
After the 1970s, the overseas operations of MMC were limited to East Asia, largely because of the business cooperation with Chrysler. As a result of this initially forced concentration of its resources, MMC has been able to develop a strong presence comparable to Toyota in this key region of the world; however MMC’s equity stake in its overseas affiliates, including those in Asia, tends to be relatively low compared to that of Toyota.
Traditionally, MMC was the only full-line manufacturer in Japan. Even the leading Japanese manufacturer, Toyota, leaves left the micro car “kei” segment to Daihatsu and the large commercial vehicle segment to Hino, as well as the assembly operations of many of its the mid-range models to its body-assembler subsidiaries. In this way, Toyota covered the full-line with the collective strength of the Toyota Group. In contraast, one could say that in trying to cover the entire auto market by itself MMC “bit off more than it could chew”, considering its firm size and managerial resources. This over-extention of resources seems to be the major cause of many of the managerial problems MMC has suffered over the years.
For MMC, it was a series of difficulties, from late 1990s until the mid-2000s. In the middle of the 1990s, MMC delivered strong results, largely because of favorable sales of its recreational vehicles (i.e., SUVs). However, several subsequent corporate misdoings, such as a sexual harassment case in the U.S., an financial scandal in Japan and so on, caused the public to lose confidence in MMC and sharp decline of the automakers sales worldwide from the latter half of the 1990s. As one misfortune followed another, its domestic sales in the mid to 2000s reached the nadir of recent years as a result of a major scandal involving a recall cover-up. 
In order to overcome the difficulties it faced since the mid-1990s, MMC tried to turn itself around by reorganizing its domestic plants and entering into business tie-ups with foreign manufacturers. In 1999, MMC and Volvo entered an equity and operational alliance covering their truck and bus operations; Volvo acquired 5% of MMC stock. However, MMC thereafter decided to enter into a business tie-up with DaimlerChrysler in 2000. MMC’s large commercial vehicle division also joined this alliance in 2001, breaking its agreement with Volvo. In 2001, DaimlerChrysler replaced Volvo as MMC's strategic alliance partner in the truck and bus sector. In 2003, the large commercial car division was spun off from MMC and became Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus Corporation. DaimlerChrysler holds a majority of Mitsubishi Fuso’s shares and since 2003 MMC has focused its business scope on the passenger car (including SUVs) and micro car segments.
In 2004, DaimlerChrysler decided not to provide MMC with any additional funds to support MMC’s ongoing restructuring, largely due to repeated recall cover-ups. From this decision, the alliance with DaimlerChrysler gradually dissolved, as MMC pursued its turnaround with assistance from Mitsubishi Group companies.
Meanwhile, MMC’s organizational capability in manufacturing operation has remained relatively strong continuously. For example, skilled shop floor leaders, engineers and managers have enabled MMC’s Mizushima factory to manufacture more than 10 models, from micro cars to commercial vans, in the same plant facility. Strong organizational capability in manufacturing is a valuable resource and has contributed to MMC’s present recovery.
A lack of consumer confidence, largely due to repeated recall cover-ups, has prolonged MMC’s slump in domestic sales, but recently there are some signs of recovery due to introduction of new models. MMC has also started to supply OEM (original equipment manufacturing) vehicles for Nissan and PSA, thereby contributing to a gradual recovery of MMC’s operating ratio, including MMC retraction of a decision to close its Okazaki plant.
As MMC has now largely emerged from its deep crisis, the automaker is strongly pushing to become the global leader of electric vehicles. In July 2009, MMC introduced into the Japanese market its first electric vehicle (EV), named i-MiEV.[1] MMC has also reached agreement with PSA to develop additional versions of the vehicle for the European market to be sold under the Peugeot and Citroën brands.
MMC has a long history of researching EVs, which originally began with its research of lead-acid battery EVs in the late-1960s. MMC has researched and worked on development of lithium-ion battery-powered EVs since early 1990s. MMC committed to the market introduction of iMiEV in 2005. Thanks to the long history its research and development of EVs and its flexible manufacturing capability, MMC stands ready to realize the first successfully mass-produced EV.


[1] i-Miev stands for: Mitsubishi innovative Electric Vehicle, based on the "i" micro car that is sold in Japan

Honda: Weathering the Global Crisis or Stuck in Japanese Corporate Quicksand?

Byosiere, Philippe, & Denise J. Luethge (2010).  Honda: Weathering the Global Crisis or Stuck in Japanese Corporate Quicksand?. Gerpisa colloquium.

Honda: Weathering the Global Crisis or Stuck in Japanese Corporate Quicksand?
 
Since our contribution on Honda entitled “Honda: Serendipity or Strategy” in the Second Automobile Revolution, the global automotive landscape has undergone drastic changes as a direct result of the global economic meltdown. Honda’s future, compared to the fate of many global automotive OEMs, initially looked rather promising as it was embarking on new ventures related to its resolve to develop an electric vehicle. As such, the groundbreaking for a new plant to build lithium-based batteries in a strategic alliance with Yuasa, as well as the announcement of number of hybrid and electric vehicles for both the domestic and global markets, provided positive signs that Honda was taking a leading role in the industry. 
Recently, Honda’s top executives referred to the global OEM market as becoming more competitive. This competitiveness is a result of the global economic crisis, but it impacts Honda primarily with the Hyundai/Kia growth in developed markets, especially in the US. Although this is a concern to Honda, top management expressed confidence that Honda would overcome this. Despite financial hardships resulting directly from the global economic crisis and declining sales in their largest market, the US, Honda seemed to be surviving the global economic crisis in good shape. 
 
This rather positive outlook for Honda in 2009 quickly turned less positive in 2010. When the switches in the power windows of many Honda vehicles were defective, Honda initially asked vehicle owners to keep the windows closed during bad weather conditions as a stopgap measure. Only recently did they issue a recall for 140,000 vehicles in the US, Europe, South America, South Africa and parts of Asia. This sounds much like the troubles facing rival Toyota (we are sure other authors will shed light on the Toyota recalls) that stopped production of a number of vehicles. What is perceived as a lack of action has triggered major concerns that go beyond Honda and the automotive industry. The fear that the once untouchable pride in Japanese quality, exemplified in virtually all Japanese export products from electronics to cars, would be tarnished by the several problems from floor mats, brakes, steering and unintended acceleration at Toyota, now suddenly exposed Honda’s power window switch recall as well as a recall related to airbag problems. The idea that some of these companies may have known about the problems, which in many cases can result is significant safety risks, has damaged the reputations of Japanese automotive manufacturers. Will these actions result in a generalized perception that Japanese manufacturers really do not put safety and quality first?
It is our contention that at this stage (February 2010) many Japanese companies, including Honda, may be experiencing the feeling of being surrounded by a sort of corporate quicksand. The six million dollar question of whether the “Japanese corporate image” will sink deeper or whether the tarnished image is limited to Toyota creates enormous levels of uncertainty as Honda determines the appropriate course of action. In the US, Honda became more proactive in tackling the power window and ABS recall issues, most likely because of the media attention given to Toyota as a result of their hesitancy to act. At the same time, unlike it US domestic competitors, Honda did not offer special incentives specifically targeting Toyota customers, a sign of solidarity among the Japanese OEMs in overseas markets. The fear of being named in the same breath with other Japanese OEMs that Japanese manufacturers have lost not only their quality focus, but also their concern for the safety of their customer, is very real. In our chapter we refer on multiple occasions to Honda being the odd-ball among the Japanese automotive companies, a reputation stemming from the philosophy of its founder, Soichiro Honda, who was never accepted by the Japanese corporate establishment, either as an individual or as a corporate representative.
 
Honda could become the victim of what could be labeled collateral damage, painted with the same broad brush of a sullied reputation as Toyota. Clearly Honda took steps to quickly correct its quality issues, much more so than the actions of Toyota. In addition, Honda can certainly not be blamed for Toyota’s increased focus on becoming the largest OEM and by perhaps cutting corners in terms of total quality management. Nor can Honda be blamed for what appears to be Toyota’s arrogance stemming from the illusion of invincibility in groupthink among its leadership. With the appointment of Ito as the new CEO, Honda seems to be putting the company back on track as an innovator in the automotive industry.
 
Although we feel that the Japanese quality image has suffered major damage, we believe that Honda will do everything possible in order to restore their reputation. Honda, has the opportunity to show the automotive world that they are as much a global OEM as they are a Japanese OEM.

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