Etats-Unis

Creative accumulation in a mature industry - Understanding the current transformation of the automotive industry

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Berggren, Christian (2012).  Creative accumulation in a mature industry - Understanding the current transformation of the automotive industry. Gerpisa colloquium Krakow May 30 - June 1. The automobile industry constitutes a paradox for established innovation theories. Few sectors have displayed such stability in their dominant product designs and incremental improvement of core technologies as the automotive industry, making it an archetypical example of a capital-intensive, oligopolistic sector competing on process efficiencies along stable trajectories. Emerging economies and state support have added a few new actors, and hard-pressed “old economies” have seen the demise of some older firms, but the basic industry structure has remained unchanged for a long time. Repeatedly researchers have expected this stable pattern to break down and open up for new radical departures, for example in the aftermath of the oil shocks in the early 1980s (Altshuler 1984), following rising environmental concerns (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 1997), or the Californian zero emissions vehicle (ZEV) mandate (Pilkington and Dyerson 2005). But the incremental trajectory prevailed and researchers forecast that the industry would fail to accommodate new technologies or regulation. Extrapolating previous trends, Fontaras & Samaras (2010:1832), for example, argued that the European industry would have great difficulties in achieving EU´s emissions targets for 2012/15, since their technologies were already “being pushed to their limits”. In the same vein, the innovation theorist Clayton Christensen predicted that electrical vehicles implied a disruptive threat to established automakers “…the electric vehicle is not only a disruptive innovation, but it involves massive architectural reconfiguration as well, a reconfiguration that must occur not only within the product itself but across the entire value chain…”(Christensen, 1997/2003, p. 252). In the tradition of industrial life cycle studies, innovation and change was expected to come from new firms enjoying an “attacker´s advantage”, which incumbents with their “core rigidities” would have a hard time to match. And yet, the last five years have witnessed a remarkable vitality among automotive incumbents, both car makers (OEMs) and component specialists. Improvements in established technologies have accelerated, and far from being ”pushed to the limit”, a report from Transport & Environment, 2011 shows that automakers will comply with EU´s new CO2 emission limits well ahead of time. At the same time a range of new modular innovations are introduced, from multi-speed gearboxes and dual-clutch transmissions, advanced valve management systems and regenerative braking, to collision avoidance systems and other proactive safety equipment. Ten years after corporate lawyers succeeded in winding down the Californian Zero Emissions Mandate, electric vehicles have re-emerged on the back of advances in lithium-ion technologies. The new EV industry includes startups, such as Tesla and Fisker. But far from being caught off-guard, incumbents dominate sales and production. Whereas the highly publicized Tesla sold 2,500 roadsters 2008-2011, Nissan’s produced 10,000 Leaf cars in its first fiscal year ending in March 2011, and Mitsubishi 5,000 EVs in 2010. Rather than being a breakthrough opportunity for “attackers”, the surge in interest for electric vehicles offers Japanese incumbents who failed to compete with Toyota´s hybrid cars a new chance, making use of economies of both scale and scope. And far from implying a “massive architectural reconfiguration …across the entire value chain” the new technologies involve a dynamic expansion of supplier networks, with ample opportunities for incumbents such as Bosch, Continental and Valeo to augment product lines with profitable high-tech modules. The growth of Asian economies, in particular China, signifies an epochal shift in the centre of the industry, but so far this change has not threatened but created opportunities for Western incumbents. Taken over by Geely in 2010, Volvo Cars, for example, has embarked on its boldest expansion plans ever, doubling production capacity within a few years, and launching highly ambitious product and technology plans, with its Scalable Product Architecture for product development, a new platform for future power-trains (“Volvo Environmental Architechture”) and an ambition to take a lead in premium market for electrified vehicles, such as a plug-in diesel hybrids. How can this “incumbent vitality” be explained in theoretical terms? Previous GERPISA studies, for example Freyssenet (2009) has analyzed different corporate trajectories within the industry. This paper purports to analyze dynamics at an industry level, which neither fits the “creative destruction” framework, nor the notion of incremental innovation in stable structures. Instead the paper will propose creative accumulation as a fruitful concept to grasp the composite and contradictory nature of current developments in the auto industrial (cf Bergek et al 2011). Creative accumulation stresses the tension between the creativity aspect, implying responses outside of the range of existing practice, and the accumulation aspect, implying knowledge development on the basis of established practices. Creative accumulation means that new and old technological disciplines and areas of expertise have to interact in novel ways to develop products with substantially improved or changed performance. New fields of knowledge have to be aligned with existing, rapidly evolving, technologies – there is no Archimedian fixed point. The paper ends by discussing organizational implications, in particular the challenge of managing creative accumulation processes by means of dynamic integration, instead of separation and isolation, as recommended in the literature on disruptive innovation.
Thème: Management de l’innovation, changements technologiques, changements de business models
Thème: Managing innovation, technological change and new business models

Renault-Nissan et GM-PSA : similitudes et différences

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 5 March, 2012 - 14:25
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa et conseiller scientifique de la Chaire de Management des Réseaux du Groupe Essca.

Même si ceci ne manquera pas de susciter quelqu’énervement chez PSA, les lumières qui nous ont été fournies cette semaine sur la forme que va prendre "l’alliance stratégique mondiale" GM-PSA font d’abord penser – comme Florence Lagarde l’a souligné déjà la semaine dernière - à Renault-Nissan. Le fait que les deux piliers de la coopération mise en avant soient le partage des plateformes d’un côté et la création d’une structure commune d’achat de l’autre, que la gouvernance de l’Alliance soit assurée par un "steering committee" composé de 4 top managers des deux entreprises, que l’identité des marques soit préservée et gérée hors de l’Alliance tout comme les outils industriels qui continueront d’être dédiés sont autant d’éléments qui rendent comparables les deux manières de procéder.

Cette démarche intermédiaire entre la fusion et la coopération ponctuelle s’explique dans les deux cas par la nécessité politique de respecter l’identité et la "nationalité" des parties d’une part et par la prudence stratégique et organisationnelle que les entreprises ont tiré de leurs expériences passées et de celles qu’ils ont vu d’autres faire d’autre part. read more

GM : un numéro 1 fragile pour une industrie mondiale à la croisée des chemins

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 14 November, 2011 - 15:07
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

La publication des résultats de GM au troisième trimestre 2011 a, de manière très significative, donné lieu à des commentaires et des titres très contrastés. En effet, d’un côté, GM redevient clairement le numéro 1 mondial avec 6,79 millions de véhicules sur les 9 premiers mois et Toyota qui avait pris la tête en 2008 rend aujourd’hui à GM plus d’un million de véhicule alors que VW est à 6,11. D’un autre côté, par rapport à 2010, les profits de GM sont en retrait de 12%.

Comme le souligne le Wall Street Journal, il est frappant de constater que GM est en 2011 dans une position symétrique de celle que l’on s’était habitué à constater du temps de "l’ancien GM" : les profits se font aux Etats-Unis et, accessoirement, en Chine; les opérations internationales sont plus problématiques et ce n’est plus seulement l’Europe qui tire les résultats vers le bas, l’Amérique du Sud, la Russie et l’Inde sont également problématiques. Les problèmes de change sont à l’origine d’une partie des problèmes mais c’est aussi l’orientation de beaucoup de ces marchés vers des véhicules modernes et moins chers qui causent les pertes de GM. read more

Semaine américaine

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 23 May, 2011 - 09:55
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

La presse nous rendait compte en fin de semaine des chances respectives d’une candidature européenne à la succession de DSK que pourrait incarner Christine Lagarde face à celles des mal nommés émergents. La question était au fond de savoir si le statu quo attaché au deal entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe qui veut que la tête de la banque mondiale soit américaine et celle du FMI européenne pouvait être contesté par une coalition conduite par la Chine qui fait valoir que, les animaux malades de la peste financière étant plutôt en Europe, les Etats-Unis seraient avisés de ne pas laisser les trop proches des patients définir les traitements. Se voit ainsi incarnée une configuration dont nous commençons à être familiers au G20 ou encore à Copenhague : dans le jeu triangulaire qui structure très régulièrement désormais la plupart des grands dossiers, la coalition américano-chinoise peut faire de l’Europe le dindon de la farce géopolitique. read more

Alternative powertrain strategies and fleet turnover in the 21st century

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Belzowski, Bruce, & Walter McManus (2011).  Alternative powertrain strategies and fleet turnover in the 21st century. Gerpisa colloquium. The changes taking place in the global automotive industry related to alternative powertrains and fuels are affecting each country or region differently. Each country or region has its own policies in place to monitor and manage vehicle fuel consumption and emissions. Countries or regions also have different numbers of new vehicles sold annually and the total numbers of vehicles in their fleets. This analysis looks at the current and future direction of alternative powertrains/fuels across four developed economies (United States, Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea) and four developing economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in order to measure the impact of increasing the number of alternative powertrains/fuels in their fleets. In particular, the analysis looks at how much of each country’s fleet will turn over to vehicles based only on alternative powertrains/fuels by 2050 by introducing three different alternative powertrain/fuel models (less aggressive, moderately aggressive, and very aggressive). A less aggressive approach will yield fleet turnover rates of 60 percent or more for most countries, a moderately aggressive approach will yield fleet turnover rates of over 80 percent for most countries, and a very aggressive approach will yield fleet turnover rates of nearly 90 percent or more for most countries.
Thème: Transformations technologiques, transformations systémiques
Thème: Technological transformations, systemic transformations

De la nouvelle géographie de la production au nouveau paysage géostratégique dans l’automobile mondiale

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 11 April, 2011 - 14:44
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

La parution des chiffres de l’Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA) sur la production 2010 dans le monde a été relativement peu commentée. Elle fait pourtant apparaître de manière criante le caractère irréversible de l’irruption d’un nouvel ordre automobile mondial. En effet, outre le fait que la Chine assure désormais presque un quart de la production (18,2 millions des 77,6 millions de VP et de VUL fabriqués dans le monde), l’importance prise par les nouveaux pays de l’automobile durant la crise ressort avec éclat. Si l’on compare ainsi 2010 à 2007 où la production mondiale avait été de 73,3 millions, il ressort que les seuls BRIC représentaient en 2007 moins de 16 millions de véhicules produits (21,4% de la production mondiale) alors qu’en 2010 ils en auront assemblés 27 millions (c’est à dire 34,6%). De même, dans la hiérarchie mondiale des pays constructeurs, la France était encore au 6ème rang en 2007. En ayant vu sa production passer de 3 à 2,2 millions alors que la production croissait rapidement ailleurs, Brésil, Inde, Mexique et Espagne sont désormais devant elle et la France pointe au 10ème rang. Au sein de l’Europe, le redéploiement des productions est également très frappant puisque, avec une production de 857 000 véhicules, l’Italie est par exemple devenue un producteur de moindre importance que la République Tchèque ou la Pologne. read more

The US automobile market after the crisis: back to business as usual or birth of a new industry?

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Jetin, Bruno (2011).  The US automobile market after the crisis: back to business as usual or birth of a new industry?. Gerpisa colloquium. The US automobile market after the crisis: back to business as usual or birth of a new industry? Bruno Jetin The US auto industry has suffered its worst crisis since the thirties. Since the spring of 2010, it is recovering progressively. GM and Chrysler emerged from bankruptcy as new slimmed-down companies with fewer brands, plants, workers, less debt and market share. It seems that the new “medium three” (GM, Ford and Chrysler) are now making profit in a market of 11 million vehicles sales a year in the US not only by selling high-margin light-trucks but also low-margin compact cars, among them hybrid cars. They have repaid their loans and have gone public again, a move that gives the government a way to progressively sell its stake in the companies' stock. They also seem better prepared to cope with the new gas price hike for they have changed their product mix to emphasize more small cars and fewer sport utility vehicles. But behind these goods news there are still factors of fragility. The US economy is recovering slowly and unemployment stays at a high level contrary to the previous recessions. A new jobless recovery as after the dotcom bubble burst in 2001 seems under way. The structural problems that have led to the crisis have worsened. Family income has dropped, poverty has risen and many have lost their health insurance. In this context, the rebound of the automobile market is no doubt fragile. The temptation is strong to use the traditional recipes such as indebtedness. Banks and captive finance automobile companies have started to issue loans more actively. Subprime auto credit is back. More than 859, 000 new cars were sold to consumers with a subprime credit rating in 2010, according to CNW Marketing research. Banks and auto loan makers are flushed with money and are making large profit on new loans since the policy of “quantitative easing” of the FED has lowered interest rates to nearly zero. GM has spent $3.5 billion to buy AmeriCredit, an auto subprime lender company, precisely to reap profits from this lucrative debt market. Another reason is to increase sales by lending to customers with a questionable credit rating. The danger is to be dependent again on bad loans to increase car sales. Our contribution will analyse these contradictory tendencies. In a first part, we will analyse the structural fragilities of the recovery on the demand side. In a second part, we will present the public policies and firms’ strategies in favour of hybrid cars and their impact on the product mix.

The US automobile market after the crisis: back to business as usual or birth of a new industry?
Bruno Jetin read more

Thème: Transformations de la demande
Thème: Transformations in demand

How the South (Was) Won: The Emergence of a New American Auto Industry

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Huelsemann, Karsten (2011).  How the South (Was) Won: The Emergence of a New American Auto Industry. Gerpisa colloquium. How the South (Was) Won: The Emergence of a New American Auto Industry When Volkswagen presented its new, American-built Passat to the public in January 2011, it was the talk of the (Detroit Motor) Show. To support its renewed drive into the world's now second largest market for automobiles, the company which is aiming to become the world largest automaker by 2018 set up a dedicated new manufacturing facility for a product tailored to the local market. The plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee is only the latest in a series of new auto manufacturing plants which have literally sprung up across the American South over the past thirty years. Already there is talk of increasing the capacity of the VW plant to half a million car per year, revoking memories of another automaker that once declared its intention to build that many vehicles in Tennessee and meanwhile has completely withdrawn assembly from there (GM/Saturn), and yet another one which actually has grown its business to that size from more humble beginnings (Nissan). The emergence of a sizeable and full-blown automotive industry (including all sorts of suppliers, an R&D network, and even corporate HQs) in the American South and the complete makeover of the American automobile industry it has brought about makes for one of the most fascinating stories the industry has to tell – yet one that recently has tended to become overlooked with attention primarily focused on growth in the BRIC countries (mostly China), or all-new topics like the hype about E-mobility (which now doubt will substantially redraw the lines of the auto industry). The paper/presentation will trace the development of this still relatively new regional center of automotive production and will put it in the context of a rapidly globalizing industry. It will argue that the emergence of a new automotive in the American South (or Southeast, if looked upon in pure geographic terms) is on the one hand the result of a rigorous, relentless and – certainly by the standards of its proponents – highly successful drive for auto-industrial recruitment. It is, at the same time however, a manifest documentation of international automakers turning abstract global market strategies into concrete facilities. Triggered by Nissan's 1980 decision to put its first American assembly plant in a Southern state, others followed quickly: Japanese OEMs and suppliers in the first wave, German premium automakers and their suppliers in a smaller second wave (coinciding with additional plants by the Japanese Big Three), and the Koreans in a third. Volkswagen is only the latest automaker to join the ranks – most likely not the last, though. Talk of "transplants" - the term widely used for the first Japanese assembly plants - has by now almost universally given place to a more respectful reference to the "new domestics", accounting for the fact that the manufacturing facilities have become part of the economic fabric of their host country and in many cases the social fabric of its localities. In turn, the automakers and suppliers which operate these plants have assigned each facility a specific role in the market strategy and the global automotive value chain of its respective corporate parent. There has been no shortage of scholarly explanations, but interestingly, the various streams and bodies of literature have also come (and gone) in waves. Concepts that will be touched upon in the presentation include regional industrial development theories; the debate on new industrial spaces and industrial districts; the (mostly business-minded) literature on globalization and building and managing global enterprises; the "lean production" school focused on the perceived masters of lean production, the Japanese (and most of all Toyota of course); the global-local nexus (i.e. localizing products and production as part of a global strategy), among others. The presentation will also try to address the question to what degree this new auto industry makes for a departure from the long-standing pattern of a "branch plant economy" which had traditionally characterized the American South.
Thème: Les industries automobiles
Thème: Automobile industries

Brazil: Autos and Ethanol – marriage of international investors and local resources

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McDermott, Michael, Denise Luethge, Marcio Cinelli, & Philippe Byosiere (2011).  Brazil: Autos and Ethanol – marriage of international investors and local resources. Gerpisa colloquium.

 Brazil: Autos and Ethanol – marriage of international investors and local resources

In common with other industries (e.g. energy), since the 1973 oil crisis the automobile industry has witnessed substantial investment in new technologies that are designed to address the economic and environmental costs associated with continued reliance upon oil. Such concerns have been exacerbated more recently by political considerations too and a desire to be increasingly energy self-sufficient. In recent years, major developed country manufacturers have made progress in introducing vehicles affording technological innovation in terms of fuel, and in 2011 several have or are introducing their first all electric vehicle(s). However, in many if not all developed country markets, conventional vehicles and gasoline continue to dominate the market.
There is one notable exception and that is Brazil and its reliance upon flexible-fuel vehicles and ethanol. This is a noteworthy example of the automobile industry adjusting successfully to the specific traits of the primary industry – in this case the local agricultural sector and sugar cane. Brazil is the world’s second largest producer of ethanol (34%), after the USA (55%).
In 1973 the Brazilian government introduced laws to compel the use of ethanol with gasoline. However, it was not until some 30 years later that Volkswagen launched in Brazil the first ever  flexible-fuel vehicle. The fleet in Brazil is now the largest in the world, and a total of 10.6 million cars and light trucks have been produced up to June 2010. By 2010 manufacturers that build flexible fuel vehicles include other major European and Japanese producers as well as GM and South Korean Kia. There are though significant regional variations in terms of ethanol use within the country.
This paper has a unique focus in that attention focuses upon a country that is simultaneously one of the most prominent Big Emerging Markets, namely Brazil, and which is also a huge auto market that is dominated by foreign auto producers. Despite foreign domination, multinationals have been adept at local adaptation, and thus Brazil is unique in that a large proportion of vehicles are dependent upon ethanol.
This paper therefore examines Brazil as a major host nation, and sheds light on a crucial aspect of international business strategy and management, namely foreign subsidiary strategy and entrepreneurship. At the same time, it considers too the role of government policy in directing manufacturers to develop flex vehicles. The Brazil example highlights the challenges facing international players as they seek to be locally-responsive and at the same time globally competitive. It provides an opportunity to consider whether aspects of the Brazil experience are transferable to other economies. As world food prices escalate to record levels in 2011, controversy surrounds ethanol derived from corn.
 
References
“Theme and variations”, The Economist,
“The post-alcohol world: Biofuels are Back”, The Economist, October 28, 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/17358802?story_id=17358802
 
“Ethanol’s Mid-Life Crisis”, The Economist, September 2, 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16952914?story_id=16952914 retrieved February 2, 2011
 
Thème: Transformations technologiques, transformations systémiques
Thème: Technological transformations, systemic transformations

Avec l’électrique, la Chine automobile sort du bois stratégique

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 20 September, 2010 - 10:57
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Le Wall Street Journal a dévoilé jeudi que le gouvernement chinois préparait un plan qui pourrait obliger les constructeurs étrangers à partager assez largement leurs technologies pour pouvoir se préserver un accès au marché national (lire l'article). Le Ministère de l’Industrie et des Technologies de l’Information (MITI) a en effet reçu la mission de concevoir les mesures qui confèreraient à la Chine à un horizon de 10 ans une position de leader mondial dans le développement et la production de véhicules électriques et hybrides. Pour cela, produire des véhicules électriques en Chine ne serait possible qu’à condition d’accepter d’entrer dans des joint-ventures dominés par la partie chinoise et de partager largement les technologies dites critiques. read more

Amérique des dealers et Europe de la distribution automobile : le jour et la nuit; Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire ?

Submitted by administrateur on 19 July, 2010 - 08:40
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Après que les constructeurs américains GM et Chrysler aient dû reconsidérer l’automne dernier, sous la pression des distributeurs, leurs projets assez logiques de résiliation pour en réduire drastiquement l’ampleur, c’est au tour du Congrès de se heurter au très puissant lobby que les dealers continuent de représenter. Dans un article du 15 juillet, le Financial Times revient sur ce phénomène et son importance aux Etats-Unis. read more

The demand for automobile in the USA before and after the crisis

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Jetin, Bruno (2010).  The demand for automobile in the USA before and after the crisis. Gerpisa colloquium.

The first objective of our contribution is to analyse the evolution of the demand for automobile of US households before and after the crisis that broke in 2008. We study the impact of the income distribution at the national level on households’ consumption and more specifically on automobile outlays on the long-term period. We also analyse the impact of households’ equities and debt on automobile demand and the evolution of the financing of automobile purchase. We also analyse the evolution of the price and cost usage of automobiles in the US. We evaluate the changes of these variables before and after the crisis using the most updated data available. The second objective is to evaluate the role of the federal state in the shaping of the automobile demand. We analyse specifically the role of the fiscal and environmental regulations. We show that the regulation adopted favoured the SUV segment to the benefit of the big three in the years 1980-2000. But in the end, this politics is also the cause of the big three present demise. If the state had adopted a proactive innovation policy, the big three would be in a much favourable competitive position today. In conclusion, we draw the lessons of the US automobile demand pattern to explain the present state of the competitiveness of the US automobile industry.

Thème: Configurations macroéconomiques et politiques nationales dans la crise
Thème: Macroeconomic configurations and national policies in the crisis

Chrysler's Re-invention: The Fiat Way

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Belzowski, Bruce (2010).  Chrysler's Re-invention: The Fiat Way. Gerpisa colloquium. This presentation will examine the lead up to the bankruptcy of Chrysler in 2009, and its subsequent management by Fiat. Besides its recent history, I will discuss the challenges Fiat faces as it tries to incorporate Chrysler into its global ambitions, and the changes that will take place in the Chrysler fleet in the U.S. The challenges are plentiful including: the financial challenges Chrysler/Fiat face as it combines the two company's products, the proposed product changes in both companies, the company's ability to meet more stringent fuel economy and emission regulations, Chrysler's dealer and supplier relations, Chrysler's integration into Fiat's global ambitions, and Fiat's ability to manage Chrysler. I will also examine Labor's new role as part owner of the company, and how this may affect current and future negotiations. Finally, I will discuss how the Chrysler-Fiat merger represents a unique blend of country and company culture that may hinder or facilitate its future success.
Thème: Car makers strategies in the crisis
Thème: Les stratégies des constructeurs dans la crise

General Motors’ Strategies for Recovery

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Senter, Richard Jr., & Walter McManus (2010).  General Motors’ Strategies for Recovery. Gerpisa colloquium.

As General Motors struggles to recover, it faces seven types of problems. First, the company needs to rationalize its product portfolio by decreasing its large reliance on light trucks, by reducing duplication in its model offerings, and by creating cars that will gain more profit. This also means aligning its product portfolio more closely with the income distribution in the United States. Second, the company’s position in the technologies of the future is uneven, so GM should at least consider rebalancing its efforts among these technologies. Third, GM’s product development processes require improvement. Fourth, it must shrink itself to the smaller market share it will actually have and reduce its costs to the decreased revenues this share will produce. The bankruptcy GM went through in the spring of 2009 was wrenching, but did slash costs. However, the company will continue to need cost containment. Fifth, GM must maintain enough capital to get through the current very deep recession. Sixth, General Motors will have to create different and more beneficial relationships both with its foreign automotive competitors and with the United States government. Finally, solving the first six types of problems probably requires changes in GM’s organizational structure and company ”culture.” The structure that Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. created for the company requires some updating to aid GM in being competitive in a global industry, but part of the difficulty is that some of the beneficial parts of Sloan’s structure have been diminished or abandoned. This has meant that GM has been prone to make poor decisions. The United States government is the primary owner of General Motors at this time. It is uncertain whether the new Board of Directors the government has established for GM will help GM change its structure and culture in beneficial ways.
 
The very deep international recession has done great damage to General Motors, as well as to Ford and Chrysler, but less harm to some of their foreign competitors. Part of the threat that GM faces is that its productive model has become less relevant to its current markets. As we discuss General Motors’ strategies for conquering the types of problems it faces, we highlight how we think the company must alter its productive model. Our emphasis is on GM’s operations in the United States, as that is where it is experiencing the most serious reverses.

Thème: Les stratégies des constructeurs dans la crise
Thème: Car makers strategies in the crisis

What role did regional policy play in addressing the U.S. auto industry crisis?

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Klier, Thomas, & Jim Rubenstein (2010).  What role did regional policy play in addressing the U.S. auto industry crisis?. Gerpisa colloquium.

Motivation
 
Today’s U.S. auto industry is geographically concentrated in a region referred to as the auto corridor. It extends south from Detroit to Alabama, with fingers extending north into Ontario and south into Mexico. The dramatic decline in sales and production during 2008 and 2009 suggested the need for economic policy to address regionally concentrated economic effects. Such policies were put in place, first by the Bush and subsequently by the Obama administration. GM and Chrysler, their supply base as well as theit two captive financing arms Chrysler, Financial and GMAC, received funds totaling up to about $100 bn under the auspices of the so-called “TARP” program (Rattner, 2009, Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009). In addition, the Department of Energy has made available grants totalling $25 bn to stimulate energy improving activities, such as the development and production of electric vehicles.
 
Approach

This paper first demonstrates the degree of spatial concentration of the U.S. auto industry (Klier and McMillen, 2006; Klier and McMillen, 2008; Klier and Rubenstein, forthcoming). Today this industry is concentrated in the center of the country a marked north-south pattern, with both coasts being empty of light vehicle assembly plants by the middle of 2010. This is noticeably different from 1979/1980, when the industry faced a similar drop-off in sales in response to the 1979 oil crisis (National Academy, 1982). In addition, today’s U.S. auto industry is comprised of two halves that only partially overlap: the Detroit-based carmakers and their operations are concentrated in the northern end of the auto corridor. Foreign-headquartered producers as well as their supply base tend to be concentrated in the southern end of the auto corridor.
The paper then summarizes the country’s economic policy response to the auto industry crisis. It turns out that most of the policy decisions taken so far in support of the auto industry were taken at the national level, despite the fact that motor vehicle and parts manufacturing is one of the most spatially concentrated manufacturing industries. The paper offers an explanation for the dominance of national policy. It suggests that the policies enacted need to be seen in light of the economic policy actions taken to respond to a severe national economic downturn. In fact, rescue efforts with regard to some of the auto makers received far greater attention once their dealer networks were to be trimmed. Vehicle dealers being, of course, the least spatially concentrated element of the automotive value chain.
The paper concludes by illustrating several regional policy initiatives regarding automobile manufacturing currently getting underway.
 
Conclusion

Despite the high degree of spatial concentration of the auto industry in North America, especially in the U.S. and Canada, economic rescue efforts taken in 2008 and 2009 were organized at the national level. Due to the very high level of economic integration of this industry across the Michigan Ontario border, the U.S. and Canadian governments coordinated their rescue efforts.
Regional policy initiatives, designed to reform labor markets as well as attract new jobs could not address the industry’s needs in crisis mode and are just getting underway.
 
References:
 
Congressional Oversight Panel. 2009. The Use of TARP Funds in Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry
 
Klier, Thomas, and James Rubenstein. Forthcoming. The Evolving geography of the U.S. MotorVehicle Industry. In: Handbook of Economic Geography and Industry Studies Frank Giarratani, Geoff Hewings, and Philip McCann, eds. (Edward Elgar)
 
Klier, Thomas, and Dan McMillen. 2008. “Evolving Agglomeration of the U.S. Auto Supplier Industry.” Journal of Regional Science 48(1): 245-267
Klier, Thomas, and Dan McMillen. 2006. “The geographic evolution of the U.S. auto industry.” Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 30(2):2-13
National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. 1982. The Competitive Status of the U.S. Auto Industry: A Study of the Influences of Technology in Determining International Industrial Competitive Advantage. National Academy Press
Rattner, Steven. 2009. Speech given at the National Press Club October 21

Thème: Macroeconomic configurations and national policies in the crisis
Thème: Configurations macroéconomiques et politiques nationales dans la crise

Toyota : la douloureuse descente du piédestal

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 8 February, 2010 - 15:54
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La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Nos collègues américains de l’International Motor Vehicle Program du MIT cherchant à saisir les problèmes des Big 3 ont expliqué régulièrement en 2009 que plus que les coûts salariaux, c’est la différence des valeurs reconnues aux produits respectifs de Toyota et de ses challengers américains qui crée la vraie différence. En comparant le positionnement prix des produits sur toutes les gammes, ils montraient que systématiquement, jusqu’à ce jour, les équivalents américains des Camry, Avalon, Tacoma ou Tundra devaient pour se vendre être proposés 2 à 3000 $ moins chers. Ils ajoutaient que cette différence là était largement supérieure à celle des coûts salariaux pour lesquels les charges de retraite allaient commencer à peser sur Toyota aussi et ne se justifiaient plus guère par un différentiel de qualité objectif. read more

2009 : moins de catastrophes que l’on ne l’avait craint, plus de changements majeurs que l’on ne veut bien le dire

Submitted by administrateur on 4 January, 2010 - 15:34
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auto2009.

La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

Comparée à ce que nous vivions il y a un an, la situation en ce début 2010 paraît autrement plus enviable. Début 2009, on pouvait avoir l’impression en effet que, un peu partout dans le monde, pays émergents inclus, la demande automobile avait tout simplement disparu dans des proportions jamais vues et sans qu’on sache dire pour combien de temps. La production avait alors été arrêtée dans un très grand nombre de sites et l’on s’attendait alors légitimement à ce que, malgré la vigueur de ces réactions, les pertes associées à ces mois entiers sans recettes conduisent à des restructurations assez drastiques de l’industrie. On identifiait les Etats-Unis dont les constructeurs encouraient depuis des années de lourdes pertes comme le cœur de ce processus de restructuration mais les "surcapacités" en Europe et, en particulier, dans les pays européens à "hauts salaires" étaient volontiers soulignées et, pour s’en émouvoir ou s’en réjouir, la situation semblait inciter à ce que la crise règle de fait ce problème structurel évoqué depuis des années. read more

The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century

in
Freyssenet, Michel (2009).  The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century. (Freyssenet M., Ed.). 468.

Depuis les années 90, on a assisté à une prolifération presque sans précédent des prévisions et des recommandations que les firmes automobiles devaient prendre en considération si elles voulaient survivre. Dans le même temps, de nombreux changements ont été sous-estimés ou n'ont pas été prévus, à commencer par la crise financière de 2008.

Nous sommes au début d'une deuxième révolution d'automobile résultant de la combinaison de deux transformations: le développement rapide de nouveaux marchés automobiles (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine) dépassant de loin tout ce qui a pu être observer dans le passé, aussi bien aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique qu'en Europe et au Japon ; et la transition vers des énergies alternatives et de nouvelles motorisations. Ces deux changements, qui en dépit des apparences sont interdépendants, vont bouleverser l'automobile, industriellement et pratiquement.

La question est maintenant de savoir qui des anciens ou des nouveaux constructeurs automobiles bénéficieront de ces bouleversements et quelles en seront les conséquences pour les salariés et les pays concernés. Le livre propose une analyse prenant en compte l'évolution des stratégies et des modèles de croissance nationaux et la recomposition des "compromis de gouvernement d'entreprise".

Plan

1 Introduction: Qu'avons-nous appris depuis 10 ans ?
Michel Freyssenet
2 Prévisions démenties et changements inattendus. Le Monde qui a changé la machine
Michel Freyssenet
3 Stratégies d'internationalisation des firmes automobiles en début du nouveau siècle. Un nouveau bond en avant?
Bruno Jetin

Première Partie: Les trajectoires différents des constructeurs automobiles japonais et coréens

4 L'espoir de Toyota de devenir le premier constructeur mondial
Koichi Shimizu
5 Nissan: depuis le bord de la faillite
Merieke Stevens et Takahiro Fujimoto
6 Honda: Heureux hasard ou stratégie, 1997-2007?
Denise J. Luethge et Philippe Byosiere
7 La renaissance de Mazda à l'ombre de Ford
Daniel Arturo Heller
8 Hyundai: Est-il possible de réaliser le rêve de devenir un des cinq premiers constructeurs mondiaux
Myeong-Kee Chung

Deuxième partie: Le résistible déclin des “Big Three” ?

9 General Motors à l'heure de la restructuration
Richard Senter, JR. et Walter McManus
10. Ford de 1993 à 2007: en perdant son chemin?
Glenn Mercer
11 Chrysler peut-il survivre à sa réinvention?
Bruce Belzowski

troisième partie: La résistance des constructeurs européens

12 Le chapitre final du modèle VW, 1995-2005?
Ulrich Jürgens
13 PSA: les difficultés de la stratégie de profit "volume et diversité"
Michel Freyssenet
14 Renault 1992-2007: mondialisation et incertitudes stratégiques
Michel Freyssenet:
15 Fiat Group Automobiles, le Phoenix de l'industrie automobile mondiale
Giuseppe Volpato
16 Du mariage céleste au divorce à terre. La trajectoire de DaimlerChrysler depuis la fusion
Holm-Detlev Köhler
17 Diriger avec le professionnalisme d'ingénieurs et des valeurs familiales. La trajectoire de BMW, d'un constructeur régional à un u acteur mondial de premier plan
Ludger Pries
18 Une rupture avec le passé: Volvo et ses mécontents
Matthias Holweg et Frits K. Pil
19 La trajectoire de Rover: une histoire salutaire
Dan Coffey

Quatrième partie: Nouveaux entrants et équipementiers mondiaux

20 Made in China: entreprises conjointes et nouveaux entrants nationaux
Hua Wang
21 La trajectoire de Maruti-Suzuki: d'un champion national à une filiale d'un constructeur japonais
Florian Becker-Ritterspach
22 Gagnants et perdants: les trajectoires suivies par les équipementiers de premier rang depuis une décennie
Vincent Frigant

23 Conclusion. La seconde révolution automobile. Promesses et incertitudes
Michel Freyssenet

Index

Cinq chapitres en version française originale

✔ Freyssenet M., Introduction : dix ans après, qu’avons-nous appris ?, original en français de « Introduction. Ten years after, what have we learnt ? », in Freyssenet M. (ed.), The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp 1-6. Édition numérique : freyssenet.com, 2009, 116 Ko, ISSN 7116-0941.

✔ Freyssenet M., Prévisions infirmées et changements inattendus. Le monde qui a changé la machine, original en français de «Wrong forecasts and inexpected changes. The World that changed the machine », in Freyssenet M. (ed.), The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp 7-37. Édition numérique : freyssenet.com, 2009, 396 Ko, ISSN 7116-0941.

✔ Freyssenet M., Renault 1992-2007, mondialisation et incertitudes stratégiques, original en français de «Renault 1992-2007 : globalisation and strategic uncertaintiy», in Freyssenet M. (ed.), The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp 267-285. Édition numérique : freyssenet.com, 2009, 733 Ko, ISSN 7116-0941.

✔ Freyssenet M., PSA : les difficultés d’une stratégie de profit « volume et diversité », original en français de «PSA: the difficulties of « volume and diversity » profit strategyg», in Freyssenet M. (ed.), The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp 246-266. Édition numérique : freyssenet.com, 2009, 396 Ko, ISSN 7116-0941.

✔ Freyssenet M., La seconde révolution automobile : ses promesses et ses incertitudes, original en français de «The second automobile revolution : promises and uncertainties», in Freyssenet M. (ed.), The Second Automobile Revolution. Trajectories of the World Carmakers in the 21st century, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp 443-454. Édition numérique : freyssenet.com, 2009, 196 Ko, ISSN 7116-0941.

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Et si ceux qui prétendent que l’on ne pourra pas sortir de la crise dans l’état où on y est entré avaient tort

Submitted by Bernard Jullien, GIS-Gerpisa, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan on 22 June, 2009 - 10:22
in

La chronique hébdomadaire de Bernard Jullien directeur du Gerpisa.

A l’heure où avec un peu de légèreté et/ou de méthode Coué, on évoque et/ou invoque une sortie de crise à un horizon assez rapproché, on peut se demander quel crédit il faut donner au lieu commun qui s’est répandu ces derniers mois et qui voudrait qu’on ne puisse sortir de la crise comme on y était rentré, que désormais, rien ne soit plus jamais comme avant, qu’il faille nécessairement régler les problèmes de structure patents depuis trop longtemps… Fort opportunément, lors de la séance de clôture des 17èmes Rencontres Internationales du Gerpisa qui se tenaient la semaine dernière à Paris, Jean-Charles Lievens est ainsi venu rappeler que ce couplet là fût largement entonné lors de la précédente crise au début des années 90 et qu’alors, avec la bouffée d’oxygène que donna la chute du mur en particulier, on avait assez brillamment réussi à rater l’occasion. read more

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